- Parametric determinism
Parametric determinism refers to a Marxist interpretation of the course of history formulated by Prof.
Ernest Mandel, and it could be viewed as one variant of Marx's historical materialismor as a philosophy of history.
In an article critical of the
Analytical Marxismof Jon Elster, Mandel explains the idea as follows:
A similar interpretation is offered by
Helmut Fleischer[http://www.praxisphilosophie.de/fleischer.htm] in "Marxism and History".
Brief explanation of the concept
One common problem in historical analysis is to understand to what extent the results of human actions can be attributed to free choices and decisions they made (or
free will), and to what extent they are a product of social or natural forces beyond their control.
To solve this problem theoretically, Mandel suggests that in almost any human situation, some factors ("
parameters") are beyond the control of individuals, while some other conditions are under their control (arguably, one group of people could "impose parameters" on another, analogous to parents imposing constraints on children). Some things can under the circumstances be changed by human action, but others cannot or will not be, and can thus be regarded as constants. A variablecan vary, yet it cannot vary in any direction whatever but only within the given parameters.
Those given, objective parameters which are beyond people's control (and thus cannot normally be changed by them) "limit" the realm of possibilities in the future; they "rule out" some conceivable future developments. In that sense human action is "determined" and "determinate". Some of these parameters refer to limits imposed by the physical world, others to limits imposed by the social set-up or
social structurethat individuals and groups operate within. The dominant ideologyor religioncould also be a given parameter.
At the same time, however, the given parameters cannot usually determine "in total" what an individual or group will do, because they have at least some (and sometimes a great deal) of personal or behavioural autonomy. They can think about their situation, and make some free choices and decisions about what they will do, within the framework of what is objectively possible for them (the choices need not be "rational" of "fully conscious" ones, they could just be "non-arbitrary" choices influenced by emotions and desires).
In this sense,
Karl Marxhad written:
"The past" (what really happened before) is not something which can be changed at all in the present, only reinterpreted, and therefore the past is a given constant which delimits what can possibly happen in the present and in the future. If the future seems relatively "open-ended" that is just because in the time-interval between now and the future, new options and actions could significantly alter what exactly the future will be.
Ten implications of this view are as follows:
*At any point in time, the outcomes of an historical process are partly predetermined, and partly uncertain because they depend on what human choices and decisions will be made in the present. Those choices are not made in a vacuum, but in an environment which makes those choices possible and gives them effect. Otherwise they would not be real choices, only imaginary choices.
*While the past and the present rule out some courses of action, a human choice is always possible between a finite number of realistic options, which often enables the experienced analyst to specify the "most likely scenarios" of what could happen in the future. Some things cannot happen, and some things are more likely to happen than others.
*Once an important choice has been made and acted upon, this will have an effect on the realm of possibilities; in particular, it will shift to a greater or lesser extent the parameters delimiting what can happen in the future. Thus, once "a train of events has been set in motion", it will foreclose other possibilities, and also it might open up some new ones.
*The process of history is both determined, in that the given parameters delimit the possible outcomes, but also open-ended, insofar as human action (or inaction) can change the historical outcomes within certain limits.
*To some extent at least, it is possible to predict what will happen in the future, if one has sufficient experience, knowledge, and insight into the relevant causal factors at work as well as how they are related. This may be a work of science or sustained practical experience.
*In historical analysis and portrayals, the analytical challenge is to understand what part of a course of events is attributable to conscious human actions and decisions, what part is shaped by the combination of given circumstances in which the human actors had to act, and what exactly is the relationship between them.
*Because the ability to prove historical assessments scientifically is limited,
ideology, a mind-setor a social mentalityabout the state of the world typically plays an important role in the perspectives people develop (Mandel refers here to an idea by Lucien Goldmann). With hindsight, it may be possible to trace out accurately why events necessarily developed in the way that they did, and not otherwise. But at the time they are happening, this is usually not, or not completely possible, and the hope(or fear) for a particular future may play an important role (here Mandel refers to the philosophy of Ernst Bloch). In addition, ideology influences whether we look upon past events as "failures" or "successes" (as many historians haved noted, history is often rewritten by the victors in great historical battles to cast themselves in an especially positive light). There is no "non-partisan" history-writing in this sense, at best we can say the historian had full regard for the known facts pertaining to the given case and frankly acknowledges his biases.
*"History" in general cannot be simply defined as "the past", because it is also "the past living in the present" and "the future living in the present". Historical thinking is not just concerned with what past events led to the present, but also with those elements from the past which are contained in the present and elements that point to the future. It involves both antecedents and consequents, including future effects. Only on that basis can we define how people can "make history" as a conscious
*The main reason for studying history is not because we should assign praise or blame, or simply because it is interesting, but because we need to study past experience "to understand the present and the future". History can be seen as a "laboratory", the lab-record of which shows how, under given conditions, people tried to achieve their goals, and what the results of their experimentations were. This can provide insight into what is likely or unlikely to succeed in future. At the very least, each generation has to come to grips with the experience of the previous generation, as well as educating the future generation.
*The theory of
historicismaccording to which the historical process as a whole has an overall purpose or teleology(or "grand design") is rejected. With Karl Marxand Friedrich Engels, Mandel thought that "'History does nothing... It is people, real, living people who do all that... “history” is not, as it were, a person apart, using people as a means to achieve its own aims; history is nothing but the activity of people pursuing their aims" [http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch06_2.htm#history] . Of course, with the proviso that people did so within given parameters not of their own making, allowing us to identify broad historical movements as determinate processes. The historical process is also not a matter of linear progress according to inevitable stages - both progress and regress can occur, and different historical outcomes are possible depending on what people do.
Perceptions and illusions
According to the theory of parametric determinism, the "human problem" in this context is usually not that human beings lack free choice or free will, or that they cannot in principle change their situation (at least to some extent), but rather it is their "awareness" of the options open to them, and their "belief" in their own ability to act on them - influenced as they may be, by their ideology, experience and emotions.
Perceptions of what people can change or act upon may vary a great deal, they might over-estimate it, or under-estimate it. Thus it may take scientific inquiry to find out what perceptions are realistic. By discovering what the determinism is, we can learn better how we can be free. Simply put, we could "bang our head against a wall", but we could also go over the wall, through a door in the wall, or around the wall. At crucial points, humans can "make history" actively with a high awareness of what they are doing, changing the course of history, but they can also "be made by history" to the extent that they passively conform to (or are forced to conform to) a situation which is mostly not of their own making and which they may not understand.
As regards the latter, Prof. Mandel referred to the condition of alienation in the sense of a diminished belief in the ability to have control over one's own life, or feeling estranged from one's real nature and purpose in life. People might reify aspects of their situation. They might regard something as inevitable ("God's will") or judge "nothing could be done to prevent it" when the real point is that, for specific reasons, nobody was prepared to do anything about it - something could have been done, but it wasn't. Thus "historical inevitability" can also be twisted into a convenient apology to justify a course of events.
In this process of making choices within a given objective framework of realistic options, plenty of illusions are also possible, insofar as humans may have all kinds of gradations of (maybe false) awareness about their true situation. They may, as Mandel argues, not even be fully aware of what motivates their own actions [http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/mandel/works/revo.htm] . Therefore, human action can have "
unintended consequences", including effects which are completely opposite to what was intended. This means that popular illusions can also shape the outcomes of historical events. If most people believe something to be the case, even although it is not true, this fact can also become a parameter limiting what can happen or influencing what will happen.
Because terrible illusions can occur, some historians are skeptical about the ability of people to change the world for the better in any real and lasting way. Indeed
postmodernismcasts doubt on the existence of progress in history as such - if e.g. Egyptians built the Great Pyramid of Gizain 2500BC, and Buzz Aldrinand Neil Armstronglanded on the moonin 1969, this represents no progress for humanity.
However, Mandel argued that this skepticism is itself based on perceptions of what people are able to know about their situation and their history. Ultimately, the skeptic believes that it is impossible for people to have sufficient knowledge of a kind that they can really change the human condition for the better, except perhaps in very small ways. It just is what it is. This skeptical view does not necessarily imply a very "deterministic" view of history however; history could also be viewed as an unpredictable
chaosor too complex to fathom.
politicians and political activists (including Mandel himself) at least do not believe that history generally is an unpredictable chaos, because in that case their own standpoints would be purely arbitrary and be "perceived" as purely arbitrary. Usually, they would argue, the chaos is limited in space and time, because in perpetual chaos, human life can hardly continue anyway; in that case, people become reactive beasts. Since people mostly do want to survive, they need some order. One can understand what really happened in history reasonably well, if one tries.
Conscious human action, Mandel argues, is mainly non-arbitrary and practical, it has a certain "logic" to it even if people are not (yet) fully aware of this. Masses of people might go into a "mad frenzy" sometimes that might be difficult to explain in rational terms, but this is the exception, not the rule. What is true is that a situation of chaos and disorder (when nothing in society seems to work properly anymore) can powerfully accentuate the irrational and non-rational aspects of human behaviour. In such situations, people with very unreasonable ideas can rise to power. This is, according to Mandel, part of the explanation of
Historical latency and the possibilities for change
The concept of parametric determinism has as its corollary the concept of "historical latency". It is not just that different historical outcomes are possible, but that each epoch of human history contains quite a few different developmental "potentials". The indications of these potentials can be empirically identified, and are not simply a speculation about "what could conceivably happen".
But they are "latent" factors in the situation, insofar as they will not necessarily be realised or actualised. Their realisation depends on human action, on the recognition of the potential that is there, and the decision to do something about it. Thus, Mandel argues that both
socialismand barbarismexist as broad "latent" developmental possibilities within modern capitalist society, even if they are not realised, and whether and which of these will be realised, depends on human choices and human actions.
Effective action to change society, he argues, has to set out from the real possibilities there are for an alternative way of doing things, not from abstract speculations about a better world. Some things are realistically possible, but not just "anything" is possible. The analytical challenge - often very difficult - is therefore to understand correctly what the real possibilities are, and which course of action would have the most fruitful effect. One can do only what one is able to do and no more, but much depends on choices about how to spend one's energies.
wars and revolutions, when people exert themselves to the maximum and have to improvise, it is discovered that people can accomplish far more than they previously thought they could do (also captured in the saying "necessity is the mother of invention"). The whole way people think is suddenly changed. But in times of cultural pessimism, general exhaustion prevails and people are generally skeptical or cynical about their ability to achieve or change very much at all.
That is just to say that what is possible to achieve can be both pessimistically underestimated and optimistically exaggerated at any time. Truly conservative people will emphasize how little potential there is for change, while rebels, visionaries, progressives and revolutionaries will emphasize how much could be changed. An important role for social scientific inquiry and
historiographyis therefore to relativise all this, and place it in a more objective perspective by looking at the relevant facts.
A dialectical view
Mandel believed that his theory of parametric determinism in history is a dialectical one, insofar as it interprets the
dualismof free willversus determinismas a unity of opposites.
The "unity" refers to the fact that the two opposites exist only "in connection" with each other, the most important implication of this being, that the result of human action can shift or change at least "some" of the parameters. This is obviously not possible in a formal mathematical model in which the parameters are assumed to be totally fixed and constant at all times, let alone in a religious portrayal of
eternity. In a dialectical model, ultimately nothing remains constant, only the pace of change varies. Thus, thinking dialectically requires that we incorporate the dimension of timedeeply into our thinking, but we can recognise this dimension, only by being attentive "both" to what is stable "and" to what is changing.
The "unity of opposites" imply the cognition of a type of connection which could exist only because it is "mediated" by something else. A "unity of opposites" according to Mandel does not normally exist without mediation or "mediating links". Without mediations, it would explode or collapse. Once we identify what those mediations are, we can move the discussion about history beyond shallow abstractions about its "
paradoxes", " contradictions" and "ironies". We can understand specifically what keeps the "unity of opposites" necessarily in place, and how one of the opposites might prevail over the other in the end. Anything can follow logically from a contradiction. But not anything can follow, if the contradiction is resolved in a particular way, and thus it is the particular way in which contradictions are resolved, that rules out some further contradictions, and rules in the possibility of other contradictions. In this way, we can show that the original contradiction gives rise not only to a set of other contradictions, but also to a set of mediations which hold the contradictions in place, and thus that the existence of the contradictions is dependent on a certain problem-solving strategy.
If history was only a
chaosor a combination of coincidences, people would be "unable" to experience free will by making choices between known options, let alone understanding their own history at all. The true enemy of freedom will therefore emphasize chaos and coincidence even if there isn't any. If history on the other hand was totally pre-determined, people would not even be able to reach an awareness that they could change things, let alone make a free choice or self-determined decisions. Determinists find this happening everywhere. Yet if people were totally free to make their history as they choose, regardless of the given circumstances, it becomes impossible to understand why their choices often do not obtain the results which they intended. Libertarianismmay be fine, until it turns into its opposite, a paralysing chaos all round. Thus, in a dialectical interpretation, human action should be viewed "both" as determined "and" as self-determining, so that the parameters of effective action can be discovered, rather than be an "eternal mystery" permitting no discovery at all.
To whom would such a philosophy appeal? It would appeal to people with sufficient experience of making free choices with real effect, yet sufficiently intelligent to understand the limits of free choices. If people experienced no real freedom at all, they would be unlikely to believe in parametric determinism. Whatever they do, has no effect. But if people believed they were totally free to do whatever they wanted at each moment, they would also reject a parametric determinism, because whatever the situation might be, it would have no effect on their actions. The philosophy makes most sense to people who are conscious of both freedom and
determinism, and Mandel implies - rightly or wrongly - that these people are overwhelmingly the modern working class, i.e. the great mass of wage and salary earners.
Mandel's dialectical interpretation is completed with the claim that the development and evolution of ideas in history is not random or arbitrary, even if it appears at first sight illogical and difficult to understand. That is, the variability of ideas also operates within given parameters, which again means that although some different conclusions can be reached, other conclusions are ruled out from the start. That is, the development of ideas has its "internal logic", but it may be that we "cannot" understand what that logic is simply by looking at the ideas themselves, "unless" we understand the social and physical context in which it occurs. It may not make sense on its own, but it does make sense in a given context. To understand the idea, we have to look at what is behind the idea. It may take an experienced observer however to separate out what ideas are attributable to the
creativityof a person or group, and what ideas are attributable to the social and physical context which influences them. And, ultimately the full "meaning" of ideas cannot be understood without that context. To ignore that context in the analysis of ideas leads to scholasticism.
While Mandel himself made some successful predictions about the future of world society (for instance, he is famous for predicting at the beginning of the 1960s, like
Milton Friedmandid, that the postwar economic boom would end at the close of the decade), his Trotskyistcritics (including his biographer Jan Willem Stutje) argue, with the benefit of hindsight, that he was far too optimistic and hopeful about the possibility of a workers' revolution in Eastern Europeand the Soviet Unionduring the Gorbachevera and after - and more generally, that his historical optimism distorted his political perspectives, so that he became too "certain" about a future that he could not be so certain about, or else crucially ambivalent.
This is arguably a rather shallow criticism insofar as the situation could well have developed in different directions, which is precisely what Mandel himself argued; in politics, one could only try to make the most of the situation at the time, and here pessimism was not conducive to action. But the more substantive criticism is that many of Mandel's future scenarios were simply not realistic, and that in reality things turned out rather differently from what he thought. This raises several questions:
*whether the theory of parametric determinism in history is faulty
*whether Mandel's "application" of the theory in his analyses was faulty
*how much we can really foresee anyway, and what distinguishes forecast from prophecy.
*whether and how much people learn from history anyway.
In answering these criticisms, Mandel himself would probably have referred to what he often called the "laboratory of history". That is, we can check the historical record, to see who predicted what, the grounds given for the prediction, and the results. On that basis, we can verify empirically what kind of thinking (and what kind of people) will produce the most accurate predictions, and what we can really predict with "usable accuracy". One reason why he favoured
Marxismwas because he believed it provided the best intellectual tools for predicting the future of society. He often cited Leon Trotskyas an example of a good Marxist able to predict the future.
This may all seem a trivial "academic" or "scholastic" debate, similar to retrospective speculations about "what could have been different", but it has very important implications for the
socialistidea of a planned economy. Obviously, if it is not possible to predict much about human behaviour with usable accuracy, then not much economic planning is feasible either - since a plan requires at least some expectation that its result "can and will be realised in the future", even if the plan is regularly adjusted for new (and unanticipated) circumstances. In general, Mandel believed that the degree of predictability in human life was very much dependent on the way society itself was organised. If e.g. many producers competed with each other for profits and markets, there was much unpredictability in what would happen. If the producers coordinated their efforts co-operatively, much would be predictable.
A deeper problem, to which Mandel alludes with his book "Trotsky: A study in the dynamic of his thought", is that "if" we regard certain conditions as possible to change for the better, we "might" be able to change them, even if currently people believe it is impossible - whereas if we regard them as unchangeable, we are unlikely to change them at all, even although they could possibly be changed ( a similar insight occurs in
pragmatism). This implies that however objective and realistic we may try to be, about history or anything else, we remain influenced by "subjective perceptions" or elements of fear, hope, willor faiththat defy reason or practicality.
It is, simply put, very "difficult" to bring scientific truths and political action together, as Marxists aim to do, in such a way that we really change the things we can change for the better to the maximum, and do not try to change things we really cannot change anyway (Marxists call this "the unity of theory and practice"). In other words, the will to change things can involve subjective perceptions of a kind for which even the best historical knowledge may offer no assistance or guide. And all perceptions of "history-making" may inescapably involve
ideology, thus - according to skeptics - casting some doubt on the very ability of people to distinguish objectively between what can be changed, and what cannot. The boundary between the two might be rather blurry. This is the basis of Karl Popper's famous philosophy of social change by "small steps" only.
Mandel's reply to this skepticism essentially was to agree that there were always "unknowns" or "fuzzy" areas in human experience; for people to accomplish anything at all or "make their own history", required taking a
risk, calculated or otherwise. One could indeed see one's life as a "wager" ultimately staked on a belief, scientifically grounded or otherwise. However, he argued it was one thing to realise all that, but another to say that the "unknowns" are "unknowable". Thus, for good or for ill, "you don't know, what you haven't tried" and more specifically "you don't know, what you haven't tried to obtain knowledge about". The limits of knowledgeand human possibilities could not be fixed in advance by philosophy; they had to be "discovered" through the test of practice. This attitude recalls Marx's famous comment that "All social life is essentially "practical". All mysteries which lead theory to mysticismfind their rational solution in human practice, and in the comprehension of this practice." [http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/index.htm] . Mandel believed, with Marx, that " ignorancenever helped anybody" except those who profited from its existence ("never underestimate human gullibility, including your own").
The general task of revolutionary science was to overcome ignorance about human life, and this could not very well be done by reconciling people with their allegedly "predetermined" fate at every opportunity. We all know we will die eventually, but that says little yet about what we can achieve before that point. Skepticism has its uses, but what those uses are, can only be verified from experience; a universal skepticism would be just as "arbitrary" as the belief that "anything is possible" - it did not lead to any new experience from which something could be learnt, including learning about the possibilities of human freedom. And such
learningcould only occur through making conscious choicesand decisionswithin given parameters, i.e. in a "non-arbitrary" (non-chaotic) environment, permitting at least some predictabilityand allowing definite experiential conclusions.
Mandel often reiterated that most people do not learn all that much from texts or from history, they learn from their own experience. They might be affected by history without knowing it. But anybody concerned with large-scale
social changewas almost automatically confronted with the need to place matters in broader historical perspective. One had to understand deeply the limits, consequences and implications of human action. Likewise, politicians making decisions affecting large numbers of people could hardly do without a profound sense of history.
*Ernest Mandel, "How To Make No Sense of Marx" (1989) in: "Analyzing Marxism. New essays on Analytical Marxism", edited by Robert Ware & Kai Nielsen, "Canadian Journal of Philosophy", Supplementary Volume 15, 1989, The University of Calgary Press, pp.105-132.
*Ernest Mandel, "Why I am a Marxist", in Gilbert Achcar (ed.), "The Legacy of Ernest Mandel". London: Verso, 1999, pp. 232-259.
*Ernest Mandel, "Die Dialektik von Produktivkraften, Produktionsverhaltenissen und Klassenkampf neben Kategorien der Latenz und des Parametrischen Determinismus in der Materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung". In: "Die Versteinerten Verhaltenisse zum tanzen Bringen. Beitrage zur Marxistischen Theorie Heute". Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1991.
*Ernest Mandel, introduction to "Beyond Perestroika: The Future of Gorbachev's USSR". London: Verso, 1989.
*Ernest Mandel, "The role of the individual in history: the case of world war two", in: "New Left Review" I-157, May-June 1986.
*Ernest Mandel, " Anticipation and Hope as Categories of Historical Materialism", in: "Historical materialism", Volume 10, Number 4 / December, 2002.
*Ernest Mandel, "Partially independent variables and internal logic in classical Marxist economic analysis’", in "Social Science Information", vol. 24 no. 3 (1985), pp. 487-88 (reprinted in Ulf Himmelstrand, "Interfaces in Economic & Social Analysis", London 1992).
*Ernest Mandel, Introduction to Leon Trotsky, "The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany", Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1971, pp. 9-46.
*Ernest Mandel, "Trotsky: A study in the dynamic of his thought". London: NLB, 1979.
*Ernest Mandel, "Liebman and Leninism". In: "Socialist Register", vol. 12, 1975.
*Ernest Mandel, "In Defence of Socialist Planning", "New Left Review" I/159, September-October 1986.
*Ernest Mandel, "The Place of Marxism in history" [http://www.marxists.org/archive/mandel/19xx/marx-hist/index.htm]
*Robert K. Merton, “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action,” American Sociological Review, 1, 6 (December 1936), 894-904, at 895-896.
Philosophy of History
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