South African Airways Flight 295

South African Airways Flight 295
Accident summary
Date 28 November 1987
Type In-flight fire (cause undetermined and disputed)
Site Indian Ocean, 134 nautical miles (248 km) north-east of Mauritius
19°10′30″S 59°38′0″E / 19.175°S 59.633333°E / -19.175; 59.633333 (SA Helderberg Debris Site1)Coordinates: 19°10′30″S 59°38′0″E / 19.175°S 59.633333°E / -19.175; 59.633333 (SA Helderberg Debris Site1)
Passengers 140
Crew 19
Injuries 0
Fatalities 159[1]
Survivors 0
Aircraft type Boeing 747-244BM
Aircraft name Helderberg
Operator South African Airways
Tail number ZS-SAS
Flight origin Chiang Kai Shek International Airport, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China
1st stopover Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam International Airport, Mauritius
Destination Jan Smuts Airport, Johannesburg, South Africa (final)

South African Airways Flight 295 (flown by a Boeing 747 named The Helderberg) was a commercial flight that suffered a catastrophic in-flight fire in the cargo area and crashed into the Indian Ocean east of Mauritius on 28 November 1987, killing everyone on board.[2][3] An extensive salvage operation was mounted in order to try to recover the flight data recorders, one of which was successfully recovered from a depth of 4,900 metres (16,100 ft)—the deepest successful salvage operation ever conducted.[4] The official inquiry, headed by Judge Cecil Margo, was unable to determine the cause of the fire, leading to a number of conspiracy theories being advanced in the following years.[5]

Contents

History of the flight

South African Airways Flight 295 was a Boeing 747-244B Combi,[3] named The Helderberg (registration ZS-SAS; serial number 22171) that was delivered to the airline in 1980. The aircraft took off on 27 November 1987 from Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport[3] (then known as Chiang Kai Shek International Airport), on a flight to Johannesburg via Mauritius. Dawie Uys served as the captain of the flight.[3][6]

The Boeing 747-244B Combi is a variant of the aircraft that permits the mixing of passengers and airfreight on the main deck according to load factors on any given route and Class B cargo compartment regulations.[3] Flight 295 had 140 passengers and six pallets of cargo on the main deck.[3] The master waybills stated that 47,000 kilograms (100,000 lb) of baggage and cargo were loaded on the plane.[7] A Taiwanese customs official performed a surprise inspection of some of the cargo; he did not find any cargo that could be characterized as suspicious.[7]

Thirty-four minutes after departure, the flight contacted Hong Kong air traffic control to obtain clearance from waypoint ELATO (22°19′N 117°30′E / 22.317°N 117.5°E / 22.317; 117.5) to ISBAN. A position report was made over ELATO at 15:03:25, followed by waypoints SUNEK at 15:53:52, ADMARK at 16:09:54 and SUKAR (12°22′N 110°54′E / 12.367°N 110.9°E / 12.367; 110.9) at 16:34:47.[8] The aircraft made a routine report to the South African Airways base at Jan Smuts (ZUR) at 15:55:18.[8]

At some point after this during the flight, a fire developed in the cargo section on the main deck.[7] The fire was probably never extinguished prior to impact. The 'smoke evacuation' checklist calls for the aircraft to be depressurised, and for two of the cabin doors to be opened.[citation needed] However, no evidence exists as to whether this checklist was followed, or whether the doors were actually opened. A crew member might have gone into the cargo hold to try to fight the fire. A charged fire extinguisher was later recovered from the wreckage on which investigators found molten metal.[7]

The following communication was recorded with Mauritius air traffic control[9][8]:

Accident scene

South African Airways Flight 295 is located in Indian Ocean
Taiwan
Johannesburg
Crash Site
Mauritius
Map of the Indian Ocean, showing the origin, destination and accident site of the flight.

When the Helderberg last informed Mauritian air traffic control of its position, its report was incorrectly understood to be relative to the airport rather than its next waypoint, which caused the subsequent search to be concentrated too close to Mauritius.[8] The United States Navy sent P-3 Orion aircraft from Diego Garcia, which were used to conduct immediate search and rescue operations in conjunction with the French Navy.[10] By the time the first surface debris was located 12 hours after impact, it had drifted considerably from the impact location. Oil slicks and eight bodies showing signs of extreme trauma appeared in the water.[7] All 140 passengers and 19 crew on the manifest were killed.

The South African Navy sent the SAS Tafelberg and the SAS Jim Fouche to assist in the recovery of debris and remains.[11] The ocean tugs John Ross and Wolraad Woltemade also attended the scene, along with the Department of Environment Affairs vessels RS Africana and RS Sonne[12]

Investigation

Rennie Van Zyl, the head South African investigator, examined three wristwatches from the baggage recovered from the surface; two of the watches were still running according to Taiwan time. Van Zyl deduced the approximate time of impact from the stopped watch. The aircraft crashed at 00:07:00, around three minutes after the last communication with air traffic control.[7] Immediately after the crash, the press and public opinion suspected that terrorism brought down the Helderberg. South African Airways was perceived as representing the South African apartheid government as the airline was government-owned, and airline offices around the world had been vandalized.[7] Experts searched for indicators of an explosion on the initial pieces of wreckage discovered, such as surface pitting, impact cavities and spatter cavities caused by white hot fragments from explosive devices that strike and melt metal alloys found in aircraft structures. Experts found none of this evidence.[7] The investigators drew blood samples from bodies and found that the bodies had soot in their tracheae.[7][13]

The South Africans mounted an underwater search, named Operation Resolve, to try to locate the wreckage. The pingers attached to the flight data recorders were not designed for deep ocean use; nevertheless, a two month long sonar search for the pingers was carried out before the effort was abandoned on 8 January 1988 when the pingers were known to have stopped transmitting.[12] Steadfast Oceaneering, a specialist deep ocean recovery company in the USA, was contracted at great expense to find the site and recover the cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder.[14] The search area is described as being comparable in size to that of the RMS Titanic, with the water at 5,000 metres (16,000 ft) being considerably deeper than any previously successful salvage operation.[15] However against all odds, the wreckage was found within two days of the sonar search of the area commencing.[15]

Three debris fields were found: 19°10′30″S 59°38′0″E / 19.175°S 59.633333°E / -19.175; 59.633333 (SA Helderberg Debris Site1), 19°9′53″S 59°38′32″E / 19.16472°S 59.64222°E / -19.16472; 59.64222 (SA Helderberg Debris Site2) and 19°9′15″S 59°37′25″E / 19.15417°S 59.62361°E / -19.15417; 59.62361 (SA Helderberg Debris Site3). These locations are 1.5, 2.3 and 2.5 km apart, which suggested that the fuselage broke up before impact.[16] On 6 January 1989, the cockpit voice recorder was salvaged successfully from a record depth of 4,900 metres (16,100 ft) by the submarine Gemini,[17] but the flight data recorder was never found.[13]

Van Zyl took the voice recorder to the National Transportation Safety Board in Washington, DC, to show his goodwill and to ensure neutral observers.[7] Van Zyl believes that if he kept the CVR in South Africa he could have been accused of covering up the truth.[7] At the NTSB, Van Zyl felt frustration that the degraded CVR, which had been in the deep ocean for fourteen months,[17] did not initially yield any useful information. Around 28 minutes into the recording the CVR indicated that the fire alarm sounded. Fourteen seconds after the fire alarm, the circuit breakers began to pop. Investigators believe that around 80 circuit breakers failed. The CVR cable failed 81 seconds after the alarm. The recording revealed the extent of the fire.[7]

Van Zyl discovered that the front-right pallet was the "seat" of the fire. The manifest said that pallet mostly comprised computers in polystyrene packaging. The investigators said that the localized fire likely came in contact with the packaging and produced gases that accumulated near the ceiling. They also said that gases ignited into a flash fire that affected the entire cargo hold. The cargo fire of Flight 295 did not burn lower than one meter above the cargo floor. The walls and ceiling of the cargo hold received severe fire damage. Van Zyl ended his investigation without discovering why the fire started.[7]

Margo commission

An official commission of inquiry was chaired by Judge Cecil Margo,[13][18] with cooperation from the aircraft manufacturer, Boeing, and the United States National Transportation Safety Board.

The official report determined that while the Helderberg was over the Indian Ocean, a fire had occurred in the main deck cargo hold, originating in the front right-hand cargo pallet.[13] Aircraft parts recovered from the ocean floor showed fire damage in temperatures over 300 °C (572 °F); tests showed that temperatures of 600 °C (1,112 °F) would have been required to melt a carbon-fibre tennis racket recovered from the crash site, leading Boeing specialist Fred Bereswill to speculate that an oxidant such as ammonium perchlorate was present.[citation needed] The reason for the loss was not specified, but two possibilities were detailed in the official report: Firstly, that the crew became incapacitated due to smoke penetration into the cockpit.[13] Secondly, that the fire weakened the structure and the tail separated leading to impact with the ocean. The commission concluded that it was impossible to allocate blame to anyone for the fire.[19]:167

The manufacturer is quoted in the report as having "contested" any scenario that involved a break-up of the aircraft and thus the commission did no more than mention the two possible scenarios in its final report as incidental to the primary cause of the accident.[16]

The commission determined that the primary cause of the aircraft's loss was that fire detection and suppression facilities in class B cargo bays (the type used aboard the 747-200 Combi) were inadequate.[5] The accident alerted aviation authorities worldwide to the fact that the regulations regarding class B bays had lagged far behind the growth in capacity of such cargo bays. The exact source of ignition was never determined, but the report concluded that sufficient evidence was found to confirm that the fire had burned for some time and that it might have caused structural damage.[5][13]

Combi design

The crash was the first fire incident on the 747 Combi and one of few fires on widebody aircraft. Fred Bereswill, the investigator from Boeing, characterized the Flight 295 fire as significant for this reason.[7] Barry Strauch of the NTSB visited Boeing's headquarters to inquire about the Combi's design. Boeing's fire test in the Combi models did not accurately match the conditions of the Helderberg's cargo hold; in accordance with federal U.S. rules, the Boeing test involved setting a bale of tobacco leaves ablaze. The fire stayed within the cargo hold. The air in the passenger cabin was designed to have a marginally higher pressure than cargo area hold, so if a crew member opened the door to the cargo hold, the air from the passenger cabin would flow into the cargo hold, stopping any smoke or gases from exiting through the door.[7]

Investigators devised a new test involving a cargo hold with conditions similar to the conditions of Flight 295; the plastic covers and extra pallets provided fuel for the fire, which would spread quickly before generating enough smoke to activate smoke alarms. The hotter flame achieved in the new test heated the air in the cargo hold. This heated air was more pressured than normal, and overcame the pressure differential between the cargo hold and the passenger cabin. When the door between the passenger and cargo holds was open, smoke and gases therefore flowed into the passenger cabin.[7]

The test as well as evidence from the accident site proved to the investigators that the design of the Boeing 747 Combi did not provide enough fire protection to the passengers.[20] The FAA confirmed this finding in 1993 with its own series of tests.[21]

After the accident South African Airways discontinued use of the Combi and the Federal Aviation Administration introduced new regulations in 1993 specifying that manual fire fighting must not be the primary means of fire suppression in the cargo compartment of the main deck.[22][23] Complying with these new standards required weight increases, which made the 747 Combi economically unviable on some routes.[7] Nevertheless the 747 Combi remained in the 747 product line up until 2002, when the last 747-400 Combi was delivered to KLM.[24]

The cenotaph of the South African Airways 295 accident, located near Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport. The cenotaph reads South African Airways Air Disaster Cenotaph (南非航空公司空難紀念碑, Hanyu Pinyin: Nánfēi Hángkōng Gōngsī Kōngnàn Jìnìanbēi, literally South African Airways Air Crash Memorial Stone)

Conspiracy theories

In January 1992, the journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society reported that the inquiry into the in-flight fire that destroyed SAA Flight 295 might be reopened because the airline had allegedly confirmed that its passenger jets had carried cargo for Armscor, a South African arms agency. The RAeS journal, Aerospace, asserted: "It is known that the crew and passengers were overcome by a main deck cargo fire, and the ignition of missile rocket fuel is one cause now under suspicion."[25] A complaint against the newspaper that first published the allegations, Weekend Star, was lodged by Armscor.[19]:168

However the inquiry was not reopened, and this might have spawned a number of conspiracy theories concerning the nature of the cargo that caused the fire, which in turn fueled public doubts about the outcome of the initial inquiry.[26] Examples of such theories include:

  • The SADF was smuggling the hoax substance red mercury on the flight for its atomic bomb project.
  • Reports from the Wouter Basson investigation suggested that a weigh receipt showing that 300 grams of a highly volatile, carbon-based chemical substance had been placed onboard the ill-fated Helderberg. WorldNetDaily of 5 July 2000 postulated that such a substance may well have caused the fire, which then led to the crash.[27]

The television show Carte Blanche dedicated an investigation into a number of these allegations.[28]

A South African government chemist examined a microscopic particle on the nylon netting next to the front-right pallet on Flight 295. The chemist found that the airflow patterns on the iron suggested that it traveled at a high velocity while in a molten state; therefore the fire on Flight 295 may have not been a flash fire triggered by packaging.[7] Fred Bereswill, the investigator from Boeing, said that this would suggest that the source of the fire would have had properties like a sparkler, with the source including its own oxidizing agent. A British fire and explosion analyst examined the exterior skin of the aircraft which had been located above the pallet; the analyst found that the skin became as hot as 300 degrees Celsius. Bereswill said that it would be difficult for a fire to burn through the skin of an aircraft in-flight because of the cool airflow outside of the aircraft.[7]

David Klatzow's theory

Dr David Klatzow was one of the forensic scientists who, on his own admission, was retained to work on the case by Boeing's counsel around the time of the official enquiry.[29] He subsequently criticized the Margo commission for spending an inordinate amount of time looking into "relatively irrelevant issues" and that the commission ignored the most important question: what was the source of the fire and who had been responsible for loading it onto the aircraft. Klatzow believes that there are certain irregularities in parts of the commission transcript that indicate that something on the CVR transcript had to be concealed.[19]:168,174

Klatzow put forward a theory that the fire likely involved substances that would not normally be carried on a passenger aircraft and that the fire was not likely a wood, cardboard, or plastic fire.[7] South Africa was under an arms embargo at the time; the South African government therefore had to buy arms clandestinely.[30] His theory postulates that the South African government placed a rocket system in the cargo hold, and that vibration cause unstable ammonium perchlorate ignite.[7][19]:172, 177, 189

Klatzow contends that conversation of the crew suggests that the fire started above the South China Sea, shortly after takeoff; he believes that this indicates that the voice recorder was not working for a long period of the flight or that the crew turned it off. If this is the case, he says it is then likely that an unknown number of the passengers would have already died from smoke inhalation from the first fire. Klatzow believes that theory is consistent with reports that find most of the passengers were in the first class area of the plane at the front as smoke from the back of the plane forced them to move forward. The captain did not land the aircraft directly after the fire, Klatzow argues, because if he had he would have been arrested for endangering the lives of his passengers and it would have caused a major problem for South Africa, costing the country and SAA R400 million. Klatzow argues that the captain, who was also a reservist in the South African Air Force, would therefore have been ordered to carry on to South Africa in hopes of making it there before the aircraft's structural integrity gave in.[19]:177-182, 186 These points have been refuted by others.[31]

On 20 July 2011, retired SAA captain Clair Fichardt announced that he had made a statement in connection with the missing Jan Smuts air traffic control tapes, after he was persuaded to do so by Klatzow.[32] Fichardt claimed that captain James Deale admitted to handing the tapes to captain Mickey Mitchell, who was chief pilot at the Johannesburg control centre on the night of the crash. Deale would further have stated that Gert van der Veer, head of SAA, and lawyer Ardie Malherbe were present during the transfer of the tapes. Earlier, during the TRC hearings, Klatzow had cross-examined Van der Veer, Mitchell and Vernon Nadel, the Operations Officer who was on duty.[33]

Post-apartheid investigation

In 1996, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), established by the post-apartheid South African Government, investigated apartheid era atrocities. In particular, the Helderberg accident was investigated to determine if there was any truth behind the conspiracy theories that the Margo Commission had covered up or missed any evidence that might implicate the previous government .[26] David Klatzow was invited by the TRC to explain his theories and cross-examine witnesses. Unlike most other hearings of the TRC, the hearing into SA 295 was conducted in camera,[29] and without any representation from the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA);[31] Klatzow considered the CAA untrustworthy because it had participated in the official enquiry, which he considered flawed. A number of key aspects of Klatgzow's theory hinged on his criticism of the actions of Judge Margo during the official enquiry, yet Judge Margo was not summoned to answer any of the allegations made against him.[29]

The commission concluded that nothing listed in the cargo manifest could have caused the fire. Following public pressure, the TRC records were released into the public domain in May 2000. Upon receiving the documents, Transport Minister Dullah Omar stated that the inquiry would be reopened if any fresh evidence was discovered.[34] The police were tasked to investigate if there was any new evidence, and to make a recommendation to the minister. In October 2002, the minister announced that no new evidence had been found to justify re-opening the enquiry.[35][36]

Passengers

Following is the list of passengers and crew nationalities on board the flight.[37]

Nationality Passengers Crew Total
 Australia 2 0 2
 Denmark 1 0 1
 West Germany 1 0 1
Hong Kong Hong Kong 2 0 2
 Japan 47 0 47
 South Korea 1 0 1
 Mauritius 2 0 2
 Netherlands 1 0 1
South Africa South Africa 52 19 71
 Republic of China (Taiwan) 30 0 30
 United Kingdom 1 0 1
Total 140 19 159[38]

Taiwanese authorities stated that 58 passengers began flying in Taipei, including 30 Taiwanese citizens, 19 South Africans, 3 Japanese, two Mauritians, one Dane, one Dutch, one British, and one West German. The other passengers transferred from other flights arriving in Taipei, and as such their nationalities were not known to Taiwanese authorities.[39]

At least two passengers died of smoke inhalation.[7]

Notable passengers

  • Kazuharu Sonoda, A professional wrestler also known as Haru Sonoda (Magic Dragon), and his bride, Mayumi Sonoda (薗田 真弓 Sonoda Mayumi?), boarded Flight 295.[40]

Dramatization

Mayday (also known as Air Emergency and Air Crash Investigation) aired an episode titled "Fanning the Flames" (also titled "Cargo Conspiracy" and "Mystery Fire" in some countries) which documents the crash.

See also


References

  1. ^ Accident description at the Aviation Safety Network
  2. ^ Ronnie Watt (1990). "Helderberg Death Flight SA 295". Southern. http://www.scribd.com/doc/302040/Extract-Watts-Book-Re-CVRs. Retrieved 2009-02-10. 
  3. ^ a b c d e f Marsh, Rob (1994). Hermann, Hilda; van Rooyen, Annlerie; van der Westhuizen, Aletta. eds (in af). Verlore Skakels: Onverklaarde Geheime van Suider-Afrika (1 ed.). Struik Publishers (Pty) Ltd. p. 14. ISBN 1-86825-407-0. 
  4. ^ "No sign of Air France flight recorders as search ends". CNN. 2009-08-20. http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/08/20/airbus.search/index.html. Retrieved 20 August 2009. 
  5. ^ a b c Marsh, Rob (1994). Hermann, Hilda; van Rooyen, Annlerie; van der Westhuizen, Aletta. eds (in af). Verlore Skakels: Onverklaarde Geheime van Suider-Afrika (1 ed.). Struik Publishers (Pty) Ltd. p. 19. ISBN 1-86825-407-0. 
  6. ^ "SAA 'murdered people aboard Helderberg'." IOL.
  7. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v "Fanning the Flames." ("Cargo Conspiracy" and "Mystery Fire") Mayday.
  8. ^ a b c d Cecil Margo et al (14 May 1990). Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Helderberg Air Disaster (Report). Pretoria: South African Civil Aviation Authority. ISBN 0-621-13030-3. http://www.caa.co.za/resource%20center/accidents%20&%20incid/reports/OldReports/Final%20Report%20ZS-SAS.pdf.  - Archive
  9. ^ Pat Hopkins, Bridget Hilton-Barber (2005). Worst Journeys. Zebra. ISBN 1770071016. http://books.google.com/?id=BxsILFdm-7IC. Retrieved 2008-12-30. 
  10. ^ Nadine Dreyer (2006). A Century of Sundays. Zebra. p. 261. ISBN 1770071067. http://books.google.com/?id=5rFGX4z8-S8C&pg=PA260&dq=SA+295+Helderberg#PPA261,M1. Retrieved 2009-02-16. 
  11. ^ Andre Wessels (20 April 2007) (PDF). The South African Navy During The Years of Conflict In Southern Africa, 1966-1989. Sabinet Online Ltd. http://search.sabinet.co.za/images/ejour/contemp/contemp_v31_n3_a15.pdf. Retrieved 2008-05-12. 
  12. ^ a b A.G. Mueller (1988). Report About the Search for the Wreck of the B74 M of South African Airways, Lost Over the Indian Ocean on November 28, 1987, Flight SA295, Taipei-Mauritius (Report). http://www.withmaliceandforethought.com/saareport.doc. Retrieved 2010-03-16. 
  13. ^ a b c d e f Marsh, Rob (1994). Hermann, Hilda; van Rooyen, Annlerie; van der Westhuizen, Aletta. eds (in af). Verlore Skakels: Onverklaarde Geheime van Suider-Afrika (1 ed.). Struik Publishers (Pty) Ltd. p. 18. ISBN 1-86825-407-0. 
  14. ^ Michael K. Kutzleb (1988). "The Search for South African Airways Flight 295". Oceans '88 Proceedings: A Partnership of Marine Interests : Conference (IEEE) 4. http://books.google.com/?id=poMSAQAAIAAJ. 
  15. ^ a b Johan Strümpfer (2006-10-16). "Deep Ocean Search Planning: A Case Study of problem Solving". http://www.strumpfer.com/Papers/HelderbergSearch.htm. 
  16. ^ a b Marsh, Rob (1994). Hermann, Hilda; van Rooyen, Annlerie; van der Westhuizen, Aletta. eds (in af). Verlore Skakels: Onverklaarde Geheime van Suider-Afrika (1 ed.). Struik Publishers (Pty) Ltd. p. 16. ISBN 1-86825-407-0. 
  17. ^ a b Marsh, Rob (1994). Hermann, Hilda; van Rooyen, Annlerie; van der Westhuizen, Aletta. eds (in af). Verlore Skakels: Onverklaarde Geheime van Suider-Afrika (1 ed.). Struik Publishers (Pty) Ltd. p. 17. ISBN 1-86825-407-0. 
  18. ^ "Selective Summary of evidence given at the inquiry on the disaster involving the Helderberg (Flight SA 295 on 28 November 1987)". South African Government. 2000-08-18. http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2000/helderbergsum.htm. Retrieved 2008-08-20. 
  19. ^ a b c d e Klatzow, David (2010). Steeped in Blood: The Life and Times of a Forensic Scientist. Cape Town, South Africa: Zebra Press. pp. 314. ISBN 978 1 86872 922 7. 
  20. ^ "Designee Newsletter". Transport Airplane Directorate, Federal Aviation Administration. 1989-04-01. pp. 12–14. http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/transport/Cert_Update/Edition01-10/media/Edition08.pdf. Retrieved 2011-07-21. 
  21. ^ Leroy Dickerson & David Blake (February 1993). Effectiveness of Hand-Held Fire Extinguishers on Cargo Container Fires. Atlantic City: Federal Aviation Administration. http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/tn92-42.pdf. 
  22. ^ "Lessons Learned From Transport Airplane Accidents: Fire". Federal Aviation Administration. http://accidents-ll.faa.gov/ll_main.cfm?TabID=3&CategoryID=18&LLID=33. Retrieved 2011-07-25. 
  23. ^ "Airworthiness Directive 93-07-15". Federal Aviation Administration. 1993-05-02. http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/0/F216CB41A2C82E168625696F0071E803?OpenDocument&Highlight=93-07-15. 
  24. ^ The Boeing 747 Family (commercial)
  25. ^ Aerospace. Royal Aeronautical Society. January 1992. 
  26. ^ a b "There is no new evidence to justify a re-opening of the Enquiry into the Helderberg Disaster of 28 November 1987, says Minister of Transport, Dullah Omar" (Press release). Department of Transport. 11 October 2002. http://www.transport.gov.za/library/helderberg-f.html. 
  27. ^ The secrets of Project Coast
  28. ^ "Helderberg Conspiracy". Carte Blanche. 2000-06-04.
  29. ^ a b c {{{litigants}}} (Truth and Reconciliation Commission Special Hearing In Camera" Helderberg Flight 1998-06-01). Text
  30. ^ How Sanctions Work: Lessons From South Africa. Palgrave Macmillan. 1999. p. 53. ISBN 0312218567. http://books.google.com/books?id=5GbW6wGjG0YC&pg=PA53. 
  31. ^ a b Robert Kirby (1998-06-26). "Helderberg: The Search for Invisible Blame". Mail and Guardian. http://mg.co.za/article/1998-06-26-helderberg-the-search-for-invisible-blame. Retrieved 2011-07-23. 
  32. ^ Zwecker, Wolfram (2011-7-21). "Helderberg: 'Hý vat opnames' (Helderberg: He took recordings)". Beeld (Johannesburg): p. 9. http://m.news24.com/beeld/Suid-Afrika/Nuus/Helderberg-H-vat-opnames-20110720. Retrieved 2011-7-21. 
  33. ^ Urquhart, Craig (2000-5-24). "TRC could reveal truth about crash". Cape Times: p. 9. http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Safety_Issues/others/helderberg/two.html. Retrieved 2011-7-21. 
  34. ^ Troye Lund (2000-05-24). "Helderberg: SAA May Face R2bn in Claims". Cape Argus. 
  35. ^ Adv J.I. Welsh & M.B. Whale (21 May 2001). Preliminary Report: Helderberg Plane Disaster (Report). Pretoria: Directorate of Special Operations. http://www.transport.gov.za/library/docs/helderberg/report0521.html. Retrieved 8 August 2011. 
  36. ^ "There is No New Evidence to Justify a Re-opening of the Enquiry into the Helderberg Disaster of 28 November 1987, says Minister of Transport, Dullah Omar" (Press release). Pretoria: Ministry of Transport. 2002-10-11. http://www.transport.gov.za/library/helderberg-f.html. Retrieved 2011-07-24. 
  37. ^ "Jet debris found in Indian Ocean." Houston Chronicle.
  38. ^ "FIVE BODIES FOUND AFTER JET CRASH". The New York Times. Associated Press. 30 November 1987. http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/30/world/five-bodies-found-after-jet-crash.html. Retrieved 25 March 2011. 
  39. ^ "Plane carrying 155 crashes in Indian Ocean." Houston Chronicle.
  40. ^ "’87読者が選んだ10大ニュース." Yomiuri Shimbun. Retrieved on November 26, 2008. "日本人乗客のうち三十八人は、南アフリカ・ケープタウンを基地にトロール漁業をしている日本水産の漁船員で、交代のための空の旅。わが国の遠洋漁業の現況を改めて浮き彫りにした事故だった。  このほか事故機には、二か月前に結婚したばかりの全日本プロレスレスラー・薗田一治さん(31)、真弓さん(30)夫妻や日本鰹鮪漁協連合会役員、新日鉄社員らも乗っていた。."(Japanese)

External links

External images
Photos at withmaliceandforethought.com/
Pre-Crash photos of ZS-SAS from Airliners.net

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