Secretaría de Inteligencia

Infrastructure

Communications in the agency are a crucial infrastructure and policy issue. For the southern bases in Patagonia, communications is provided by the "Servicios y Tecnologia S.R.L." (SyT) company. The rest of SIDE's communications, phone tapping abilities, data transfer, etc. are handled by Telecom and Telefónica of Argentina, Movistar, Nextel, CTI Móvil, and "Compañía de Radiocomuncaciones Móviles, S.A." Data processing computers for SIDE are provided by Bull. [ [http://www.bull.com/ Bull] , company's official website. URL accessed on April 23, 2006.]

In 2001, under Secretary of Intelligence Fernando De Santibañes, the Secretariat began a major upgrade of its computer infrastructure.

Personnel

Recent reports (since the Secretariat does not declare the exact amount of personnel it embodies) state that about 2.500 to 3.000 agents are currently working both inside and outside of Argentina for the Secretariat. [" [http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/04/23/elpais/p-00315.htm El Gobierno pasa a controlar las tareas de inteligencia militar] ", Clarín. URL accessed on April 23, 2006.] Only the Secretary and the Subsecretary of Intelligence are public functionaries, the rest of SIDE personnel must act and work secretly, as stated by the Intelligence Reform Law 25.520.

About 80% of the personnel works in areas depending of the Interior Subsecretariat, and the remaining on the Exterior and Support Subsecretariats. According to the agent's rank, they get paid from 1.800 to 2.678 Argentine Pesos a month; directors, reach $3.000 ARS.

Delegates abroad are inserted in the frame of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, but receive monthly salaries by the Secretariat. Their job mainly consists of producing reports on current events of interests in the country they are stationed in, as well as establishing links with the local intelligence services.

Recruitment

Citizens are recruited into SIDE using a well-known and widely used method by worldwide intelligence agencies during the Cold War. The procedure was simple, recruiting students from national universities based on an assessment of their character, behavior and intelligence.

The method was first used during the Onganía government, under the command of Secretary of Intelligence Gral. Señorans, who himself said "a person who enters at 20 years of age having studied in an university, should be an excellent professional at 30 years of age". During the process of recruitment, experts focused on four essential points when assessing their targets:

* Language and expressivity.
* Discretion in the way they dress.
* A meticulous way of life.
* Possession of personal life experiences allowing them to adapt their personality to different situations.

When the student accepted the invitation to join SIDE, he was sent to be trained in the National Intelligence School. Nevertheless, not all spies where chosen from universities; it was common that experienced agents recommended people they dealt with their personal life, and who they thought were apt to develop a career in the world of intelligence.

Spies recruited that way were classified as "confidents", they received a monthly pay while their abilities to carry out espionage activities were being tested. Once a confident proved that they could be trusted they were promoted to the "contracted collaborators" category. In those cases, agents were targets of specific controls, an "ambiental" surveillance on them done by the counter-intelligence division.

If agents met their superiors expectations, they signed a temporary work contract which was renewable periodically. In the "confident" career, the third step was denominated "temporary personnel" (Personal Temporario, in Spanish), as soon as they reached that stage, they were allowed to take courses in the National Intelligence School.

Finally, after two years of being assigned as temporary personnel, they were reassigned as permanent "civil personnel" (PC, in Spanish). There was not a specified period of time between the steps of a "confident" and "civil personnel", there were cases of people who took 15 years before they were fully integrated. Today SIDE is rumored to be a "very closed family", one which nobody enters without a recommendation. Interviews with agents state that "the first rule is to forget your name", and that new personnel are baptized with a fake identity.

Associates

'Associates' are companies used for support in covert operations, known cases detailed by Argentine justice include masquerade companies such as: Tecnit, CF COM, OSGRA S.R.L, Tiumayú S.A, AMSUD S.A, EMCOSUD S.A, IDIS ("Instituto de Investigaciones y Servicios") S.R.L, and "Canteras Brandsen S.R.L." Apparently all of them are run by SIDE personnel, and are used for covert operations inside of Argentina, and as well to set up agents in foreign countries. One known example is that of an agent acting as a broker of EMCOSUD in Santiago de Chile.

Culture

The Secretary and Subsecretary of Intelligence are referred as "Señor Cinco" ("Mr. Five") and "Señor Ocho" ("Mr. Eight") respectively, because of the location of their offices, the fifth and eight floor of the 25 de Mayo building. Other aliases include "Señor Tres" ("Mr. Three") for the Subsecretary of Foreign Intelligence and "Señor Nueve" ("Mr. Nine") for the Subsecretary of Logistics. Cafeterias in buildings of the Secretariat are referred to as "casinos".

Although unconfirmed, the name "Señor Cinco" is alleged to the 1956 restructuring of SIDE, closely modelled on the British MI6 whose first director was Captain Sir George Mansfield Smith-Cumming. Often dropping the "Smith", Cumming used his initial "C" as a codename which was also used by all subsequent directors of MI6. The name "Señor Cinco" was allegedly adapted from it.

The main building in Ave. 25 de Mayo is referred to as "Central". Agents working for SIDE call the Secretariat simply as "La Casa" ("The House"). Foreign personnel whose function is to act as a link between their agency and SIDE are referred as "COI". Also, spies are sometimes referred by politicians as "Servis", meaning somebody pertaining to "The Service" (in English).

The official mascot of SIDE is the Fox ("Zorro"). Among SIDE personnel the Dirección de Observaciones Judiciales ("Directorate of Judicial Surveillance", DOJ) is referred to as "Ojota" ("Sandal"); furthermore, "Ojota" implies "Ojo" ("Eye").

Numbers

An interesting and sometimes confusing fact about the Secretariat's internal organization is the use of a specially structured sequence of numbers to refer to different internal divisions. For example, the Subsecretariat of Interior Intelligence is numbered '8', and its dependencies, such as the Directorates of Counterintelligence and Judicial Surveillance are numbered '84' and '85' respectively. The same case applies for the Subsecretariat of Exterior Intelligence, or '3', its divisions go from '32' for the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence to '34' for the Division of Transnational Crime and International Terrorism.

Even though it is still hard to discern how exactly SIDE's number sequence is structured because of the lack of an official explanation, it is known that single numbers used to refer to a certain director, '3', '5', '8', '9'. Sometimes the numbers represent their location in the 25 de Mayo buildings.

Public media and fiction

As with most intelligence agencies, the Secretariat only makes public statements when dealing with national issues or scandals. For the Secretariat, the AMIA investigation, the Sofía Fijman incident, and the participation in the Senate Brives scandal were the most notorious episodes of media attention.

During the AMIA investigation, Claudio Lifschitz, a judicial employee involved in the investigation wrote a book about his experiences and theories that the Secretariat knew beforehand about the bombing and could not stop it. [" [http://www.clarin.com/diario/2003/09/11/p-01701.htm AMIA: un testigo apuntó a la SIDE] ", Clarín. URL accessed on April 23, 2006.]

In 2005, "Tiempo de Valientes", a comedy made by Damián Szifron dealt with the age old rivalry between the Secretariat and the Federal Police. The Secretariat had a major role in the film's plot, it was portrayed as containing very sinister and corrupt individuals for the most part. In the end, the movie vindicates the role of intelligence in the national government. [imdb title|id=0462570|title=Tiempo de valientes. URL accessed on April 23, 2006.]

In the American ABC TV show "Alias", Nadia Santos ("Mía Maestro") is an ex-SIDE agent who now works for the CIA. 'Argentine intelligence' has been referenced several times in the show.

Publications

Every three months, SIDE publishes an official magazine through the National Intelligence School.

Books dedicated to the Secretariat's history and scandals include "Los sospechosos de siempre: Historia del espionaje en la Argentina" [" [http://www.boimvaser.com.ar/ Los sospechosos de siempre: Historia del espionaje en la Argentina] ", Jorge Boimvaser. URL accessed on February 7, 2006.] by Jorge Boimvaser. The book was to be published in 1995, but then Secretary of Intelligence Hugo Anzorreguy allegedly made a monetary deal with its author and "Editorial Planeta" to hold off on the book's publication. The book was finally published in 2001, and actually is one of the most complete sources of information about historical SIDE facts, even though it elegantly evades a clear definition of its inner structure.

In July 2006, " [http://www.tematika.com/articulo/detalleArticulo.jsp?idArticulo=434299 SIDE: La Argentina secreta] " by Gerardo Young was published. Young's book is aimed towards more personal aspects of the Secretariat, such as its most famous members, internal rules, and details about its management and operations.

Historical operations

Dirty War

The SIDE played a role during the Dirty War and participated to Operation Condor, the international network of South American intelligence agencies. A secret detention camp for Operation Condor in Buenos Aires, known as Automotores Orletti (also known as "Tactical Operations Centre 18"), functioned under the orders of SIDE from 1976 to 1979.

One of the most important operations carried out by SIDE was the planning of a triple assassination attempt in Europe with the collaboration of the Chilean DINA, and the Uruguayan intelligence service. The objective was to murder, if possible at the same time, three special personalities living in Paris, France: Isabel Allende (daughter of Salvador Allende, Chile), Rodolfo Matarollo (member of the ERP, Argentina), and Enrique Erro (ex-senator, Uruguay), all of them opposed the South American defacto regimes, and well known dissidents. The idea was originally suggested by DINA director Manuel Contreras, and was planned out in the Billinghurst base in Buenos Aires, previous approval of Argentine dictator Jorge Rafael Videla.

The assassinations were to be carried with 9 mm or 22 caliber guns brought to France via Argentine diplomatic carriage. The operation failed due to the Argentine Ambassador in Paris's reluctance to give the bag to the agents without first revealing what was in it.

Operation Marylin

When Héctor José Cámpora assumed the presidency of Argentina on May 25 1973, Cuba sent a wave of diplomats and official delegates to Argentina, proposing that was the time to resume cultural interchanges with the Argentine government. However, the Argentine intelligence services, under the hood of the anti-communist paranoia that covered much of the western hemisphere those days, distrusted the real motives for the influx of the Cubans.

It was then that an analyst in the Secretariat discovered a human weakness in the Cuban delegates: their extreme sensitivity for blonde women that stood out. The 'La Biela' café bar in the neighbourhood of Recoleta was a common place for the Cubans to be spotted hunting for their female counterparts by SIDE agents.

The Secretariat orchestrated a plan to infiltrate, assess and obtain information as fast as can be possible. In this operation, the main actors would be blonde women, SIDE began recruiting capable women in known 'hot' spots of the city, some of them managed by people closely connected with the Secretariat.

Three women were cited for an interview in downtown Buenos Aires, proposed a job opportunity that involved establishing a solid and stable link with the Cuban delegates, all accepted. They would be paid almost the same money they earned at their previous jobs, plus a few honoraries for the services provided. During a week, the agents were taught basic intelligence theories and practices, they observed photographs of the Cubans they were going to 'mark', and they had time to elaborate complex backstories for their supposed identities.

The director in charge of Operation Marylin selected divorced women with children on purpose, so they would not raise any suspicions in their families or targets. The three females claimed to work doing 'sales' for a living, allowing them to be available at many hours in which to be in direct contact with the Cubans. Finally, after a subtle approximation scene played out in the 'La Biela' café bar, two of the Cuban delegates fell for the trap, but the third one apparently was not interested in establishing relations.

After six weeks of observations and wire-taps (the spies made sure to plant the Cuban's rooms with microphones), the Cuban embassy unexpectedly ordered its delegates to return to La Habana. SIDE did not obtain any relevant information about their suspicions that the Cubans were assisting and supporting Argentine leftists groups, but the agency realised that women are a very useful tool in the espionage world. All three females that participated in the operation were offered permanent jobs in SIDE; only once accepted, the rest went back to the Buenos Aires night scene.

Operation Marylin proved that using women to exploit weaknesses in men was a feasible and convenient method of extracting information, and observating both foreign and internal adversaries of Argentina. Although the real insertion of females into the Argentine espionage community started in the mid-1960s, during the 70s, one of Argentina's most agitated eras, the women of SIDE started playing a crucial role in its operations.

Operation Veinte Años

On October 28, 1995, Enrique Gorriarán Merlo, Argentina's most wanted terrorist, was captured in the little town of Tepoztlán, 60 miles away Mexico City, and flown back to Argentina in a plane rented by SIDE. Merlo had been involved in numerous criminal, activities during the 1970s and 1980's, most notably the assassination of Anastasio Somoza Debayle on September 17 in Paraguay, and for orchestrating the 1989 attack on the La Tablada military barracks by the MTP group.

Merlo, who claims it was a kidnapping orchestrated by SIDE,Gorrarián Merlo's narration of the story of his kidnapping was published in a [http://www.pagina12.com.ar/1999/99-01/99-01-24/pag15.htm Página/12 newspaper interview.] ] had traveled to Mexico to meet with Mexican politicians of the PRD, who were cooperating in an international push to free the guerrillas responsible for the La Tablada attack who were, and still are, serving prison term in Argentine jails. Merlo arrived in the Mexican capital with a fake Uruguayan passport, where he soon realized that the Mexican security forces were following him. He thought they were just doing basic surveillance on him to see if he was doing any illegal activity in Mexican territory.

On Saturday, October 28th, he spotted three Argentine-looking men in Tepoztlán Square, "one of which" -he said- "looked like he was from the Argentine intelligence service or the police". Merlo was driving a friend's truck, after spotting the Argentines, he tried to lose his entourage of followers by driving into the town of Cuatula. A few minutes later, Merlo claims he was stopped, surrounded, and shot several times until he put his hands out the truck's destroyed window.

Merlo goes on to claim that the Mexican security services handcuffed him, and made him face the Argentine, who nodded silently ("affirming that he was who they were looking for").

Merlo was taken into the Mexican Migrations Department, where he claims was interrogated three times by SIDE agents. The last time they interrogated him, they asked if he was Gorriarán Merlo, he answered back "yes", and simultaneously asked for asylum. ("Mexico has a tradition for giving asylum to politically prosecuted people in other Latin American countries"). One of the Mexican police man told them that there was "receptiveness" about his request, but at five in the morning, Mexican authorities took him to the airport and put in him in SIDE's plane, where the same SIDE agent from Tepoztlán and the interrogation was present.

The operation was carried out by the Sala Patria group of the Secretariat. [ [http://neo.jus.gov.ar/indulta/amia/listados/t/Toranzo,_Rodrigo_08-10-03.pdf "Toranzo, Rodrigo 08-10-03] ", Government of Argentina. URL accessed on April 23, 2006.] Gorrarián Merlo served prison time in Argentina for his crimes, and was later pardoned in 2003 by President Eduardo Duhalde.

AMIA investigation

Judicial reports during the investigation have displayed sufficient evidence of SIDE's involvement in the AMIA case investigation. In 2003, President Néstor Kirchner signed a decree that opened all SIDE's files ("about 15,000") and allowed the ex-Secretary of Intelligence, Hugo Anzorreguy, and many intelligence personnel involved in the case (including Horacio Antonio Stiusso, Patricio Miguel Finnen, and Alejandro Brousson) to be available to declare in the investigation about Judge Galeano's mishandling during his job as official judge of the case.

Several critics blame SIDE for failing to stall the attack on the AMIA as the warnings of an impeding attack on Argentine soil were received. Judicial evidence presented during the AMIA investigation show that the Argentine Embassy in Beirut, the Brazilian Intelligence Service, and the Argentine Consulate in Milan warned SIDE about the attack on the Jewish organization.

Operation Cabildo

Juan José Galeano, the judge in charge of the AMIA Bombing investigation, asked Hugo Anzorreguy to help him advance the investigation by bribing a key witness who refused to testify, Carlos Telledín. The Secretariat provided 400 thousand dollars so he would change his testimony, thus forcing progress on a case that had been stuck for two years.

SIDE explicitly participated in the operation to give the money to Telledín's wife, Ana Boragni in a Lloyds Bank located on Ave. Cabildo in Buenos Aires. The public importance about this operation is that it explicitly implied SIDE working to orchestrate a cover-up in the AMIA case.

The operation was described thoroughly by SIDE agents who testified later on, during President Néstor Kirchner's push for truth and new leads on the case.

urveillance of foreign embassies

During the 1960s, SIDE set up constant surveillance on embassies from the Eastern bloc as well as other communist nations in Buenos Aires.

During the investigation of the AMIA case, then counter-intelligence operations director Horacio Antonio Stiusso, was asked about why SIDE had been tapping the phone lines and setting bugs in the embassies of Iran and Cuba in Buenos Aires. Stiusso alleged that those tasks were simply counter-intelligence operations and had no relationship with the AMIA case. Nevertheless, in 1998, Argentina fired many Iranian diplomats on the basis of "phone taps" that provided evidence Iran was involved in the AMIA bombing.

ofía Fijman incident

In the late 1990s, an employee of the Secretariat in charge of the National Intelligence School's security was convicted for murder. For more information see the School's incidents.

Operation Ciprés

In the late nineties, Nasrim Mokhtari an Iranian prostitute and hairdresser, who was believed to be involved with an Iranian support group that helped carry out the bombings of the Israeli Embassy in 1992, and the AMIA building in 1994, was tricked by the Secretariat into coming back to Argentina from Europe.

The information on her involvement came from Wilson Dos Santos, a suspect in the AMIA case. Dos Santos was a Brazilian taxi boy and thief who did a significant amount of smuggling in the Triple Frontier. Mokhtari had a romantic relationship with Dos Santos in Buenos Aires, and claims he knew about the plot to bomb the AMIA building through her connection in the Buenos Aires islamic community. It is suspected that Dos Santos worked, or works for the Brazilian Intelligence Service, or the Brazilian Police.

Furthermore, a few weeks before the bombing, Dos Santos entered the Argentine, Israeli, and Brazilian consulates in Milán, Italy, to warn about the upcoming attacks. There was no trace of him until he was captured in Switzerland years later, holding 8 passports, and extradited to Argentina on charges of false testimony, of which he is currently serving prison time.

When Dos Santos was declared for the Argentine justice ministry, even though there were weak points in his statements, he named Mokhtari and alleged she knew about the bombings ("he later testified that he warned the consulates on information he got from her").

The Argentine justice system, needing new leads because of all the pressure that put on them to solve both bombings, ordered SIDE to find Mokhtari and bring her back to Argentina for interrogation. A plan codenamed "Operation Ciprés" was orchestrated to locate her in Europe and bring her back to Argentina. Once located in Switzerland, she was conned into coming back to Argentina by SIDE agents, who posed as meat businessmen who proposed her a job as a translator to do business with Iran.

The operation was carried out by the Sala Patria group, and it has been said that the operation cost the Secretariat about half a million dollars, which included locating her, paying costs, agents and buying information in Cyprus, France, Belgium and Switzerland. The French intelligence service also helped SIDE locate Mokhtari in while she was living in Paris, France.

Mokthari was on an Air France flight to Montevideo, Uruguay, that made a stop in Buenos Aires. When she got off to change planes, she was arrested by a special counter-terrorism team of the Federal Police. Mokhtari was eventually let free, there were no sufficient proofs to incriminate her in anything, or even being involved in the Iranian support group that carried out the AMIA bombing. [" [http://www.clarin.com/diario/1999/01/12/t-01201d.htm Nadie quiere correr con los gastos de la iraní] ", Clarín. URL accessed on April 23, 2006.]

A restriction on leaving the country was imposed on her, and later lifted, but Nasrim Mokhtari had already lost her contacts in Paris, had no money, and become a publicly known 'international terrorist'. The Secretariat declined to provide sufficient accommodations for Mokhtari to stay in Argentina, and Iran did not want her in its territory because of the sufficient international problems she brought to them with Iran being blamed in participating in the AMIA bombing. She currently is hospitalized at a mental institution in Buenos Aires. [" [http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-52665-2005-06-20.html De terrorista internacional a internada en el Moyano] ", Página/12. URL accessed on April 23, 2006.]

Breakdown of CIA relations

[
Ross Newland, ex-CIA Station Chief Buenos Aires] In January of 2001, Página/12 newspaper published an article [" [http://www.pagina12.com.ar/2001/01-01/01-01-07/pag15.htm El continuismo de la SIDE] ", Página/12. URL accessed on April 23, 2006.] on the Secretariat's troubled relations with the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Along with the article was a photo and personal details of Ross Newland, then CIA Station Chief in Buenos Aires, who was expected to become head of the Latin American division in the CIA. Official reports say that the CIA wanted SIDE to investigate the operations of the Russian Mafia and ex-KGB agents who had just arrived in Argentina. The reasons were that the Russian Mafia was using Argentina as an intermediate country for smuggling illegal aliens to the U.S. At the time, Argentines did not require visas for tourist visits to the United States, and obtaining Argentine citizenship had recently been relatively easy.

Other reasons to investigate the recently arrived ex-KGB and Russian Mafia was that many ex-CIA and ex-FBI personnel had private security businesses in Argentina and in many other Latin American countries. The arrival of the Russian gang in Argentina put their businesses at risk of competition. A few months before, Newland, a 50 year old who loved living in Buenos Aires [" [http://www.pagina12.com.ar/2001/01-01/01-01-14/pag03.htm La CIA traslada a su agente local] ", Página/12. URL accessed on April 23, 2006.] accused SIDE of following him and fellow CIA operatives in Argentina, as well as doing audio surveillance on them.

Information leaked out that "Patricio Finnen" and "Alejandro Brousson", two old notorious important staff members of the Secretariat, were responsible for carrying out the operation from the Billinghurst base. The Americans were not the only ones affected by the Secretariat's peculiar attention, the Israeli Mossad and the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND).

American reports state that the Secretariat never helped the CIA on its requests, instead, the U.S. alleged that SIDE helped the "newcomers" insert themselves in the market by selling them information. The CIA became furious since they had historically contributed funds for SIDE to do their operations, and SIDE was indirectly helping the Russians in their smuggling operation. They expected the Secretaria to be on their side, and to make the 'Russian problem' a government issue, therefore putting pressure on the Russians.

The head of the Secretariat's counter-intelligence service at the time, retired Major Alejandro Broussoun, an ex military servicemen from the Argentine Army Engineers Corps, and an ex-follower of the ultra-nationalist right wing "Carapintadas" organization in the 1980s and 1990s, was blamed by the CIA for the leak of their station chief on the popular newspaper.

The United States investigation into the incident with SIDE, revealed that the picture and information of Ross Newland was given to the newspaper by the Secretariat itself. Meanwhile, SIDE tried to repair relations by explaining the scandal through another theory.

At the end of the scandal, with Ross Newland's identity uncovered, and the episode becoming a major embarrassment for the U.S. and Argentina in the worldwide intelligence community, the CIA removed its Station Chief from Argentina, and said they were going to permanently move their offices to Montevideo, Uruguay because of their problems working together with SIDE. Also, as a result of this, the head of the SIDE counter-intelligence service, retired Major "Alejandro Brousson" was expelled because of the American diplomatic pressure to punish the responsible of an act they considered "a violation of game rules" (in the intelligence community, that is).

The scandal not only put a stain in the CIA's relations with SIDE, but also made the Americans distrust the Argentine intelligence community which they had come to collaborate extensively during the Carlos Menem administration.

Bribes in the Senate

In 2001, the National Executive Power ("Poder Ejecutivo Nacional", PEN) under President Fernando de la Rúa used the Secretariat's reserved funds to orchestrate the bribery of several senators in the Argentine Congress. The motive behind the operation was to assure the promotion of the new labor reform law that the De La Rúa was promoting. When it became known to the public the level of involvement of the Executive Branch a national scandal broke out, and De La Rúa's administration took heavy criticism.

The Secretariat was then under the command of banker Fernando De Santibañes, a close friend of then President De La Rúa, who promised to make sweeping changes to the Secretariat of Intelligence. The opposition parties in Argentina, specially during the government of Carlos Menem, saw SIDE as a political tool and promised sweeping reforms if it won the 1999 presidential elections.

After the details participation of SIDE in scandal became publicly known, then President Fernando de la Rúa asked then Secretary of Intelligence, Fernando De Santibañes to resign. He is currently charged with participating in the Senate bribes case.

Recently more details were described about the operation by Pontacuarto, the participation of SIDE was so deep to even include visits of people involved with the bribes to the main SIDE headquarters.

Assassination of Piqueteros

The Justice system and the press blame the Secretariat participating in the organization of events on 2002 that led to the deaths of Darío Santillán and Maximiliano Kosteki, two piqueteros that were protesting in the Pueyrredón Bridge in Buenos Aires. Both men were shot in the back by Buenos Aires Police's officers armed with shotguns.

Months before the tragedy, the Secretariat had produced intelligence reports that the Piqueteros' assemblies and protests were being attended by the Colombian extremist group FARC. [" [http://www.masacredeavellaneda.org/index.php?blog=11&title=carlos_soria&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1 The politicians responsible for the massacre] ", MasacreAvellaneda.org. URL accessed on August 25, 2006.] Furthermore, minutes before the assassinations, there were three phone calls, between Alfredo Fanchiotti, a policeman involved in the incident, and the Subsecretary of Intelligence, at the time, Oscar Rodríguez. [" [http://www.masacredeavellaneda.org/index.php?blog=11&title=carlos_soria&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1 The politicians responsible for the massacre] ", MasacreAvellaneda.org. URL accessed on August 25, 2006.]

During the trial, police officers involved in the scene that day, declared that a man from SIDE approached them and told them that "Today there will be incidents", furthermore incriminating the Secretariat on the assassinations.

Carlos Soria, then Secretary of State Intelligence, later declared that "democracy works in order, we needed to establish order", making the public theory that the assassinations were orchestrated by SIDE to psychologically reduce the Piqueteros movements motivation and their influence in Argentine society.

The assassinations, which sparked outrage by Piquetero groups, made then interim President Eduardo Duhalde to call for elections earlier than planned, and since then, the federal government has established a non-repressive policy towards the Piqueteros.

In 2005, President Néstor Kirchner, signed a decree that released all of the Secretariats's files about the tragedy to the public, and made some SIDE staff and agents available for questioning if necessary. [ [http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=106570 National Decree 538/2005] , President of Argentina. URL accessed on April 23, 2006.] The files released don't include any relevant information in them.

Nobody in SIDE has yet been charged with participating in the case. On the second anniversary of the assassinations, protesters and piqueteros marched towards the Billinghurst base were the phone calls originated and proceeded to deface the property and manifest public outrage towards the organization. [" [http://argentina.indymedia.org/archives/archive_by_id.php?id=1203&category_id=26 Escrache a la SIDE] ", Indymedia. URL accessed on April 23, 2006.] It was the first time ever people protested at one of SIDE's facilities.

References

ee also

*National Intelligence System
*National Intelligence School
*Directorate of Judicial Surveillance
*National Directorate of Criminal Intelligence
*National Directorate of Strategic Military Intelligence
*List of Secretaries of Intelligence
*

External links

*es icon [http://www.side.gov.ar Official website, now defunct]
*es icon en icon [http://web.archive.org/web/19970619124458/www.side.gov.ar/SIDE000.htm Archive of the defunct website]
*es icon [http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-74999/70496/norma.htm Intelligence Reform Law 25.520]
*es icon [http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-4999/458/texact.htm Interior Security Law 24.059]

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